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Abstract:
The paper focuses on the political consciousness and political
participation of residents of the African townships of Port
Elizabeth. It draws on historical research on political
traditions and political culture in the 1940s and 1950s, and
compares these with the period of 'peoples power' in the mid-
1980s. It examines the changes in political participation in the
transition period from 1990 to the present, and the continuities
or discontinuities in peoples' understanding of democracy. Some
tentative conclusions are reached about hegemony, civil society,
and participatory or representative democracy.
I. Introduction
While guests at the inauguration of the new president, Nelson
Mandela, sat down to a celebratory meal of fine food and wines
in Pretoria on May 10 1994, members of the street committees of
Kwazakele dealt out portions of cabbage stew to supporters of the
African National Congress. How did the residents of Kwazakele,
Port Elizabeth, feel about this 'day of liberation' following the
historic elections of 26-28 April?
Mike Mabusela wrote that in Kwazakele,
...election celebrations rolled on through the night and into the
morning. Some shed tears of joy; others danced, jived and toyi-
toyied. Some took to the streets in their cars and drove around with
hooters blaring and music playing. (EP Herald 4 Hay 1994)
Voters in the impoverished township of Kwazakele expressed how
they felt about participation in the historic elections of 26-28
April variously as 'very happy, 'excited', 'proud', 'confident'
2and 'strong'.1 These emotions are unsurprising in a 'liberation
election', and were expressed by most of the new electorate
around the country; what is more interesting than the general
enthusiasm for a new experience was the sense of historical
destiny expressed by residents; the sense of very personal
involvement in contributing to the realisation of democracy -
expressed in quotes such as "My dream of voting for the
government I want had finally come true" or "I have been waiting
for that day all my life" and "It was not a surprise because it
was what I have fought for".2
90% or more of the residents of Kwazakele voted for the ANC.3
The hegemony of the ANC among Africans in the Eastern Cape is not
in dispute; the election results merely confirm what historians
and political, analysts have long believed to be the case. In this
paper, I explore not only the reasons for this hegemony and the
political traditions upon which it is based, but also raise some
questions about how ordinary people in the region understand the
'new polities'. Does the new South Africa conform to their
understanding of democracy, and how will they participate
politically in the future?
While there is overwhelming support for the ANC, this is not
unconditional, and expectations of 'delivery' are high. These
expectations are not only material, expressed primarily in terms
of access to jobs, housing, and education, but are also political
in the broader sense: expressing a desire for empowerment, as in
1
 This information is from a random survey of fifty
residents of Kwazakele, conducted between April 29 and May 6. I
am grateful to Feya Njokweni, a resident of Kwazakele who
conducted this survey and the previous survey in 1993. The survey
was not designed primarily to produce quantitative data, and
included many 'open questions' to ascertain how residents felt
about various issues.
Ibid.
Ibid. This statistic is based on the same survey; a
detailed breakdown of election results by township or by voting
or counting station had not been made available by the IEC at the
time of writing.
the following examples where residents were asked how they
thought South Africa will be different after the election: "Since
we are going to be ruled by the government we have elected
everything will be different"; and "I'll be able to voice out my
views, there will be free political activities and respect of
human dignity"; "'Under the ANC government I hope people will be
equal and sovereignty will rest on the will of the people, and
that law will be the expression of the general will"'
Reinforcing these expectations is, on the one hand, a spirit of
reconciliation - "I appeal to all blacks to forget the past and
think about the future and contribute to the building of the new
South Africa"' - together with a strong loyalty to the
government - expressed as "The party we have elected knows the
struggle of the people, they also know what we need" or, in this
quote from a resident asked what he can do if the new government
does not meet expectations: "Honestly I don't think it will do
such a thing because it has sacrificed a lot for the oppressed
people of SA. I will be shocked and I won't vote for any party
next time".1 On the other hand, there is a commitment to
ensuring their expectations are met through pressurising of,
government structures: to the same question, residents responded
with "He will strike, making sit-ins and boycotts";"There will
be strikes, boycotts and mass actions against it."'
This tension between the empowerment of ordinary people and their
sometimes unquestioning loyalty is also reflected in the
contradictory statements of their leaders; so while Cyril
Ramaphosa calls for the "deepening of democracy" in the "new
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 Noxolo Dlabantu, resident of Kwazakele, quoted in the EP
Herald 4 May 1994.
' Nelson Bopani, resident of Block 4A, Kwazakele Single
Mens' Quarters, quoted in EP Herald 4 May 1994.
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period of struggle"' and the RDP proclaims that the "collective
heritage of struggle...is our greatest strength",10 Raymond
Mhlaba and Nelson Mandela are warning that "the time for mass
action is over"."
I argue below that there are two traditions of political
participation, going back many decades, and arising from this
experience there are two understandings of democracy which are
being taken into the future and which are in tension. I do this
through focusing on the African townships of Port Elizabeth in
general, and Kwazakele in particular, where recent research has
been conducted. In the process, the story of the residents of a
particular locality is woven together with the traditions and
conditions of the wider region; and the general structural
conditions under which these conditions flourished are woven
together with the specific experience of ordinary people.
Methodologies of conventional political and structural history
are used together with 'history from below' and the use of oral
testimony, and these are combined with the survey techniques of
political sociology and, it could be argued, the methods of
cultural anthropology in an attempt to understand the 'discourse'
or language of struggle used by ordinary people.
II: The Context
The Eastern Cape, along with the Northern Transvaal, heads the
poverty stakes in South Africa. Its per capita income is second
lowest of the nine new provinces (Fox p 8); its unemployment rate
is highest; and more than half the adult population had,no formal
' Cyril Ramaphose addressing the press before the opening of
the ANC's Regional General Council in the Eastern Cape, quoted
in Eastern Province Herald 13 June 1994.
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 ANC, 1994, Reconstruction and Development Programme, p 3.
" Nelson Mandela quoted in EP Herald of 21 April 1994,
addressing an election rally in Graaff-Reinnett, Eastern Cape;
Raymond Mhlaba quoted in EP Herald 8 June 1994.
income at all in 1991. Levels of literacy and life expectancy are
lower than in any province except the Northern Transvaal.(DBSA
1994) The overwhelming majority of the population of the region
is African, with 6% of the population being white and 6.7%
coloured; the Xhosa-speaking African population is almost
entirely ethnically homogeneous.(Fox 1994 p 8) With levels of
poverty increasing steadily in the formerly 'independent'
homelands of Ciskei and Transkei, there has been a steady stream
of urbanization since the 1930s to the two poles of industrial
development. East London and Fort Elizabeth.
The African sector of Fort Elizabeth's population grew from 27%
in 1921 to 43% in 1960, and stands now at over 60%. From the
beginning of commercial activity in the city, Africans gained
employment as unskilled labourers, initially loading boats on the
beach before the harbour was built. The growth of industrial
activity - initially footwear, then from the 1920s the motor and
. component industry - did not open up great opportunities for
employment and the development of skills for Africans; a policy
of employing 'poor whites' in the 1920s and 1930s, and coloureds
in the 1940s and 1950s, was rigidly implemented. So, in 1962, the
percentage of African workers at Ford and General Motors - the
two large motor assembly plants in PE - was a mere 4%. Where
African workers were employed in industry in the post-war era,
this was primarily in the food and textile sectors, which were
more labour intensive and relied on cheap, unskilled labour. Most
African workers were employed in the service sector, by the
Municipality, the docks, the railways and in domestic or catering
work.(Cherry 1992 p 34, 36).
Despite the disadvantages faced by Africans in terms of
employment and skills opportunities, the African townships were
always accepted as part of the city. While the usual controls
over African residents and removals of inconvenient slums
periodically took place, the PE Municipality prided itself on its
innovations in the provision of housing for Africans, and its
building of 'model' townships such as McNamee Village (part of
New Brighton) in the 1930s and Kwazakele in the 1950s.(Robinson
1990 p 219) Such housing schemes were based on the assumption
that those Africans living in Port Elizabeth should be encouraged
to have a stable family life; access to housing was often
conditional upon marriage. The small number of migrant workers,
and the failure of the local authorities to implement influx
control before the 1950s, were crucial factors in creating a
stable urban community which perceived itself, and was perceived
to be, 'part of the city'. Even after its implementation, the
African sector of the population grew steadily as conditions in
the surrounding rural areas continued to deteriorate. (Cherry
1992 p 9)
While New Brighton, as the oldest 'established' township, has
been the subject of extensive research (Baines 1994, Robinson
1990), the material for much of this paper is drawn from
Kwazakele township and its precursor, the non-racial village of
Korsten. There are a number of reasons for this. It has been
argued that support for civic organisations, especially of the
'mass participatory' type where structures of 'direct democracy'
in the form of street and area committees were established,
tended to be concentrated in the old municipal housing areas
built in the 1950s and 1960s. (Seekings 1992 p 229). This is true
of Kwazakele, otherwise known as 'Site and Service', a township
built in 1956-8 which accommodated the
58 000 Africans moved from the non-racial township of Korsten.
While many of those moved were newly urbanized, many others had
experienced the relative freedom of living in a village not
controlled by municipal authorities; many had attended non-racial
church schools, and many had participated in the multi-racial
politics of the Congress alliance. In 1983 Kwazakele had the
largest population of Fort Elizabeth's black townships - an
official population of just over 100 000 out of a total of 330
000. (White 1984 p 8) The population of Kwazakele has since grown
in size, but the nature of the community is significantly
homogeneous. It is homogeneous not only in terms of race,
ethnicity, language and religion - which would hold true for most
African townships in the Eastern Cape - but also in terms of
income and living conditions.
Many residents of Kwazakele have thus been living in Port
Elizabeth for many decades, and there is a sense of stability and
of 'belonging' to the city. At the same time, it is an extremely
poor community; with the exception of the small number of traders
and professionals, it is almost entirely working-class; and the
level of unemployment is high as it is elsewhere in PE. In 1983
the average monthly household income in Kwazakele was R 254 -
slightly lower than New Brighton, but slightly higher than Zwide
and Soweto. (White 1984 p 11) Unlike New Brighton, where there
are areas of affluent housing adjacent to extremely impoverished
areas like the infamous Red Location, Kwazakele is made up mostly
of typical 'matchbox' style municipal housing. Host houses are
overcrowded, and residents live in close proximity to one another
in very similar circumstances in terms of access to facilities
and problems with services and amenities. The relative stability
of the Kwazakele community is illustrated by the figures for
households per dwelling, where Kwazekele has the highest number
of single households per housing unit - 66%, which is higher than
the average of 58% for all the townships. (Ibid p 9). This
facilitated a tight network of support and information sharing
among residents in the 1980s.
This is not to say that Kwazakele is completely homogeneous and
undifferentiated; there are pockets of shack settlement in
between formal housing; there is stratification along lines of
age, gender, education and employment, as in other similar
townships. However, it is argued here that the relative stability
and homogeneity of the township, combined with its level of
poverty and deprivation, established the circumstances in the
1980s in which a high level of political participation occurred.
An interesting comparison can be made with an area like
Soweto/Veeplaas, which had a reputation for being more militant
and being the 'home' of the amabutho (youth militia) which would
be in accordance with a theory of 'marginalisation' of youth.
8Riordan refers to people in this drastically poor and unstable
shack settlement as 'Ukuhleleleka', translated as 'the
marginalised people' (Riordan 1988b p 2). By contrast, political
participation in Kwazakele was characterised by a high level of
participation by middle-aged residents, who were usually working
and usually living in a stable nuclear or extended family
situation. (Cherry 1993b p 64)
lilt Xt>* emergence of political traditions
The above framework was the one within which African residents
of Port Elizabeth 'made their own history' and developed strong
traditions of political participation. The homogeneity and
stability of the African population led to a tradition of
participation in existing structures, however limited; of demands
for inclusion into the accepted 'mainstream' of political life
as institutionalised through citizenship and electoral
representation. Simultaneously, the exclusion of Africans from
economic opportunities, the unemployment, poverty and appalling
living conditions experienced, was responded to with militant
forms of mass politics which operated outside of institutional
frameworks. This mass politics involved the meshing of class
politics with inclusive populist politics.
a) The Politics of Inclusion
Andre Odendaal describes Port Elizabeth as "the birthplace of
organised African politics in South Africa". (Odendaal p 5). From
as early as 1878 residents of the Native Strangers Location sent
petitions to the authorities; and in 1882 the Imbumba Yama Afrika
- the "first proto-nationalist organization" - was formed.(Ibid)
From the participation of the African middle class in the Korsten
Village Management Board at the turn of the century (Kirk 1990),
to the participation of CPSA and ANC members in elections to the
New Brighton Advisory Board in the 1930s (Baines 1994 Ch 8), Port
Elizabeth's African population used most of the opportunities
presented under the relatively liberal administration of the pre-
apartheid era. Moreover, although Africans were not eligible to
stand for election to the PE City Council, members of the
Communist Party of South Africa, working closely with the newly-
formed black trade unions and the ANC, were elected to the
council in the 1940s.(Cherry 1992) In addition, the qualified
franchise that allowed a minority of Africans to vote for Native
Representatives in parliament resulted in Margaret Ballinger
being returned as the representative of the Eastern Cape right
up until 1959, when the system was finally abolished. Ballinger's
husband, William, was involved in attempts to establish trade
unions for PE's African workforce in the early 1940s. Bodies such
as the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, the Native Welfare
Society, the Friends of Africa and the Distressed Areas
Committee, all reflected the acceptance of white liberals that
Africans were 'citizens' of the city, and played a role in the
articulation of their needs.(Cherry 1992 p 52)
This African middle-class political participation was not unusual
in the first half of the 20th century in South Africa, and the
strategies of the early ANC have been thoroughly examined in this
period. Essentially, the demand put forward was for Africans who
were 'civilized' to be included as full citizens, and the
strategies used to attain these demands involved small numbers
of the African elite engaging in deputations and negotiations
with the authorities. What was different about PE's townships was
that because the African middle class was so small - as Africans
were excluded from employment and educational opportunities - and
yet the African population of the city was relatively stable and
homogeneous, the African elite, and their sympathizers of
different colours, developed a much broader constituency, which
involved a different style of politics. Hence the involvement of
the Ballingers in trade union politics, and the quirky trade
union leader Mohamed Desai, a member of the CPSA, being a member
of the City Council while organizing mass protests in New
Brighton.
During the 1940s the competing tradition of mass politics began
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to emerge, with protests against food prices and rent boycotts
being followed in the post-war era by a new style of working
class politics. For a time these traditions existed side by side,
building the broad-based, populist politics of class alliance.
The leadership of the old middle-class elite was gradually
replaced in the late 1940s by that of younger, working class
leaders who often played important roles within the trade union
movement as well as within the ANC.(Baines 1994 p 202; Cherry
1992; Lodge p 51)
1952 was in many ways the turning point for the
'incorporationist' style of politics, and the old moderates were
pushed out as much by the new intransigence of local authorities
as by their ineffectiveness in the eyes of their constituency.
The Defiance Campaign of 1952 and the riots in New Brighton in
the same year represented the end of the relative tolerance of
the previously liberal administration. Mot only were repressive
measures such as a curfew implemented, but the council finally
began to implement influx control. (Robinson p 261; Baines 1994
Ch 9).
The destruction of Korsten and the creation of Kwazakele provides
a nice illustration of the tensions within the ANC's politics of
class alliance, and how it could not hold together in the new
context of harsh implementation of apartheid by PE's formerly
liberal council. In one of the biggest mass removals in South
Africa's history, around 58 000 people were systematically
removed from the non-racial township of Korsten in the two years
between 1956 and 1958. Korsten, the one area in PE where Africans
had the right to freehold title, had become the home of the
thousands of immigrants from rural areas in the urbanisation
process of the 1930s and 1940s. Despite previous attempts to
remove Korsten as a 'health hazard', the township continued to
grow. As in other similar parts of the country, the small, non-
racial group of landlords rack-rented living space to the new
immigrants. During the early 1950s, Korsten had a vibrant
political life centred on the ANC; women were particularly active
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in various ANC campaigns such as the campaign against Bantu
Education. Children who had attended the non-racial church .
schools in the area were now to be forced to attend Bantu
Education schools in Hew Brighton; as part of the boycott of
these schools, women in Korsten taught their children in open
areas:
Our group used to meet In an open space in Korsten where the bus
terminus' is now. . .The children used to write on the ground, and
learn to count using stones.. .When the government started to realise
that the schools were empty they brought in the police and disrupted
our schools. When they started to chase us away from those open
spaces, we opened spaces in our houses, and made space in the yards
in Korsten. (Cherry 1988 p 89)
The ANC was ambivalent about the destruction of Korsten; Govan
Mbeki explains the dilemma faced by the leaderships
' How, in relation to the property owners, what was the ANC going to
do? Must it defend the right of the property owners, whom the ANC
knew to be some of the worst exploiters? Must it acknowledge their
right to freehold property in Korsten, and must it attack the
government for moving people from there, when in fact it was better
in that two-roomed house in Kwaxakela than living in a shanty in
Koraten? But then, the people who lived in the shanties preferred
to live in those shanties rather than go to Kwaxakele...so this was
the dilemma facing the ANC. (Cherry, 1988, p 114)
It is possible that this ambivalence was also felt by the shack
dwellers; while conditions in Kwazakele were to be better,
materially, in the long run, this was by no means apparent at the
time of the removals. Moreover, in return for a serviced site,
the shack-dwellers would have to give up the freedom which
Korsten offered, and the threat of influx control weighed heavily
in their minds:
The people who lived in the shanties preferred to live (there)
rather than go to Kwazakele ...they would not surrender the
privileges - what they called their rights - to go to a house in New
Brighton. Because in New Brighton they were subjected to all the
municipal regulations affecting life in a municipal township.
(Cherry 1988 p 110)
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The African Ratepayers of Korsten, a small body representing the
property owners, put up a last-minute fight to protect their
interests; but without the whole-hearted support of the ANC, and
being alienated from the Korsten working-class to whom they were
exploitative landlords, their deputations and court applications
stood no chance against the inexorable logic of 'slum clearance'.
The municipality consciously exploited this class division,
moving first the most recent immigrants to the city, then all the
other shack dwellers, leaving the property-owners isolated and
without the potential to mobilize a mass base even if they had
been able to do so.
At the same time as showing up the weaknesses of the ANC'a class
alliance, the removals effectively 'homogenized' the African
population, reducing these class divisions.
While the politics of inclusion were rendered largely unviable
at the height of the apartheid era - from the mid-1950s until the
late 1970s - the 1980s saw the reemergence of this strand of
political tradition together with an upsurge in mass militancy.
So, while the strategies of the United Democratic Front involved
boycotting the elections for Black Local Authorities and the
pressurizing of councillors to resign, sometimes through violent
means, the leadership of PE's African townships simultaneously
engaged in negotiations with the white authorities. Swilling
argued at the time that this reflected a maturity on the part of -
the leadership which presented an opportunity for negotiation
which was lost to the white authorities, because of the
intransigence of the security forces - and their mistaken belief
that the strategy of the UDF was to make the township
'ungovernable'.(Swilling 1988) However, for the activists of PE's
townships the two strategies were not seen as mutually exclusive;
and reflected the 'joining' of the two traditions of political
participation. Hence Mkhuseli Jack, spokesman for the Consumer
boycott committee, explained that in retrospect:
They (the street and area committees) embodied a fusion of various
strategies; at the tijne, there was no sense of (national)
negotiation in the near future. It was correct at some stages to be
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••an to be reasonable by followers) we had a broad strategy of
maximising publicity, winning public opinion. You can't throw people
into a wax and show no signs that you are against the war. The kinds
of actions we engaged in were biting (eg consumer boycotts) - but
we would appear reasonable} consolidate and extend support to
sectors which had not cared. (Interview, 12/8/93)
In the same vein, the engagement of civic leaders with the FE
Municipality's town clerk, and the beginning of discussions
around the creation of one, non-racial municipality, began in the
late 1980s, at the height of the State of Emergency. Yet while
there was some continuity in the willingness on the part of the
leadership to engage in negotiation and appear 'reasonable',
these strategies were not always based on the same concept of
democracy. It could be argued that in the earlier period, a more
pluralist or liberal understanding of democracy prevailed, and
that inclusion was being demanded for particular interest groups
- 'civilised' Africans, or urban insiders, or residents of a
particular township. In the 1980s, the hegemonic position of the
ANC meant that they embodied a less tolerant version of
democracy, where they represented and spoke for all 'the people'
when negotiations took place.
b) The Politics of Exclusion
While the stability of the urban African population allowed for
this 'inclusionist' tradition to develop, the exclusion of most
of the African working clasB from skilled employment and
educational opportunities simultaneously generated another, more
militant and class-based tradition to emerge. In the 1950s and
again in the 1980s, it is this tradition which became hegemonic,
infusing the populist politics of the ANC and the UDF with class
content.
It could be argued that this parallel tradition began as far back
as 1846, when the first' recorded strike in South African history
- a strike by Mfengu beach labourers - occurred. (Baines 1988 p
57). The mass protests in the town centre after the arrest of ICU
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leader Masabala in 1920, which saw the shooting of twenty-two
people, was another 'first' - foreshadowing similar urban
massacres in later decades. (Baines 1988 p iv). Yet perhaps we
should not overemphasize the significance of these isolated
events in terms of the building of political tradition; in the
19th Century and the early decades of the 20th, the moderate,
inclusionist tradition built by the African elite was probably,
on balance, more significant. It was the growth of a stable,
urbanized African proletariat which saw the gradual emergence of
the militant political tradition from the 1930s.
Another result of the stability of urban Africans in Port
Elizabeth was the high proportion of women - higher than any
other major urban centre by the 1920s, remaining,almost equal to,
and sometimes surpassing, the male population through the next
few decades. (Balnea, 1988 p 45; 1994 p 153; Robinson p 240).
African women played an important role in developing the militant
tradition; Robinson describes how, in the 1920s and 1930s in New
Brighton, the administration perceived women as "especially vocal
and determined"; and that !
This persisted and assumed an increasingly organised form, until by
tha lata 1940s and 1950s tha Location Superintendent was receiving
frequent and aver larger deputations from women demanding council
action on a number of social and physical problems experienced in
the township. (Robinson p 239).
The women of Korsten, too, were particularly vociferous, and
through the ANC Women's League they took up local demands which
were sometimes not part of ANC campaigns. Innovative and militant
in their tactics, they participated in many of the campaigns of
the 1950s such as the campaign against Bantu Education described
above. In addition, they took action around issues such as the
imposition of influx control, racism on the part of shopkeepers,
and support for general strikes. In one instance, to prevent male
workers from using the buses to go to work during a stayaway, the
women dressed in overalls and ambushed the men:
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...it was decided that •ach woman should organizs herself an overall
and a stick. Than ws want to lia in tha opan space near General
Tyroa, in tha tall grass. Ha than waitad thara, and wa saw tha man
coming down from Naw Brighton Labour with thair food cans. When thay
ware closa to use, one of the woman stood up, and said 'Tahisa,
tshisal' (Beat them) and they did not know wa were women, because
we had overalls and knobkieries. I could not hit even one man I was
laughing so much at these woman attacking the men and tha men
running back to the townships I That was very successful, none of
them want to ride the busses and tha busses were taken away froa
General Tyres. (Cherry 1988 p 90)
Moreover, the consumer boycott strategy that was to be so
successfully used in PE in the 1980s was pioneered by these
women, who targeted shops which refused to employ Africans, and
forced them in some cases to revise their employment practices.
(Cherry 1988 p 87) A member of the Womens League in Korsten at
the time explained that the militancy of women was related to
their independence from the male leadership of the AHC:
Tha woman today are not organised like we were organised. They mix
with man, that is whyt wa did not work with men, we did not want
man, wa wanted to work ourselves. (Cherry 1988 p 90)
Militant mass politics was not confined to women, however. During
the Second World War, and in the immediate post-war years, the
ANC in the African townships was radicalized as a new generation
of working-class leaders came to occupy key positions in the
organization. Protest marches into town against high prices
during the war were followed by a rent boycott in 1946.(Baines
1994 pp 201-4; Robinson pp 239-244) Despite attempts in the early
1940s to build African trade unions, these did not - with the
exception of the Food and Canning Workers Union - lead to lasting
organizations with a strong and militant working-class
constituency. In the post-war years, a 'new' type of trade union
appeared, and the strikes by dock workers in 1945-6 and by
laundry workers in- 1948 indicated both the weak structural
position of African workers in Port Elizabeth and a new, militant
tradition of labour action led by African working-class
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leadership. This tradition was characterized by non-racial and
class discourses, as well as the mobilization of community
support for worker demands and a populist discourse - all of
which were to reappear in later decades. Hence a pamphlet in
English and Xhosa issued in 1946 during the dockworkers strike
exhorted people to send donations to a strike fund, and refrain
from scabbing; it ended with the phrase: "A victory for the
stevedoring workers is a victory for the community" (Cherry 1993
p 85). During the laundry workers' strike, a pamphlet appealed
to the general public in the name of the working class:
The workers need the support of the public and the working class to
achieve their aims...Increased wages for any section of the working
class means increased prosperity for all.. .Workers of Port
Elizabeth, tomorrow it nay be your turn to fight for your rights,
for better living conditions and wages sufficient to meet the
soaring cost of living. (Cherry 1992 p 111).
As has been well-documented, the 1950s saw the extension of the
tradition of militant, mass politics incorporating both class and
populist discourses.(Lodge, Walker, Baines, Cherry, Robinson) The
organisational form this took was the close alliance of the ANC
with trade unions aligned to SACTU, under a leadership which
often wore 'two hats', being both ANC and trade union leaders,
and often former members of the now-banned CPSA. While this saw
the (largely working class) residents of New Brighton, Korsten
and later Kwazakele participating on a large scale in ANC
national campaigns such as the Defiance Campaign of 1952, the
Freedom Charter campaign of 1955, the Bantu Education campaign
and the campaign against the extension of passes to women in
1956, it 3aw also the use of localised 'mass actions' such as
work stayaways and consumer boycotts. Host of the work stayaways
involved the ANC and SACTU calling workers out in 'support of
political demands - usually with a high degree of success, and
sometimes in defiance of ANC national leadership, as was the case
wit,h the three-day stayaway around the general election of 1958
and SACTU's 'Pound a Day' campaign. Other successful stayaways
were held in 1950, in the June 26 Day of Protest against the
17
Suppression of Communism Act; in March 1951 against the
disenf ranchisement of coloureds; and in November 1952, in protest
against the imposition of the Riotous Assemblies Act and a curfew
following the New Brighton riots. But there were also instances
where the ANC supported worker struggles, one example being the
LKB strike of 1959. In this instance, the FCHU won an important
victory against wage cuts when the ANC threatened a boycott of
LKB. In addition, public pressure was exerted through a mass
meeting jointly organized by the union and the ANC, and the
distribution of pamphlets; and the exhortations on other workers
not to scab. Management backed down, reinstated the workers who
had been locked out and restored their previous wage levels in
the form of a bonus. Thousands of pamphlets were produced to
inform the community of the victory, and the FCWU extended thanks
to the ANC, SACTU, SACPO and SACOD for their support. (Cherry
1992 p 205-6)
As repression increased in the 1950s and the space created by the
liberal council was gradually eroded, the ANC responded by
adopted the 'M-Plan' which envisaged a tight network at street
level, providing the means of communication between leaders and
ordinary members. Although a national plan, it has been argued
that it was only in Port Elizabeth's African townships where this
strategy was implemented with any effect.(Lodge p 231, Baines
1994 p 237, Mbeki p 74). This strategy, although not thoroughly
implemented even in these areas, contributed to the ANC's ability
to continue with successful mass actions throughout the 1950s,
with highly effective stayaways continuing until 1961 when the
last general strike called by the Congress Alliance as a 'final
warning to the government' was supported for all three days, and
involved significant numbers of coloured as well as African
workers. (Cherry 1992 p 214) The banning of the ANC and the
collapse of SACTU led, in Port Elizabeth as elsewhere in the
country, to the 'lost decade' of resistance.
When resistance politics reemerged in the late 1970s in Port
Elizabeth, it combined the same mixture of moderate and militant
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political tradition; and once again, as repression grew fiercer
in response to ever wider mobilization, the politics of militancy
gained hegemony over that of moderation. Thus the middle-class
leadership of the early PEBCO gave way to the radical leadership
of the ANC 'old guard' and the PE Youth Congress; and trade
unions, despite initial tensions between their leadership and the
UDF over the employment of stayaway tactics (Pillay 1985), were
drawn by their membership increasingly under the hegemony of the
Congress movement. As repression intensified from 19S5, the
strategies of the 1950s were consciously resurrected; as in 1952,
when public meetings were banned in Hew Brighton, in March 1985
UDF meetings were banned in Port Elizabeth. An extensive network
of street and area committees was established with the
inspiration of the M-Plan, which enabled the UDF to engage in
extremely successful consumer boycotts and work stayaways.
What is interesting for the purpose of this paper is not the
details of these campaigns and how successful they were, but the
extent of involvement by ordinary- residents in such structures
and actions, and what sort of political culture was built. There
was an extraordinary high level of political consciousness and
political participation by residents of townships such as
Kwazakele during the 1980s. Riordan, in a survey of political
loyalties of Africans in Port Elizabeth in 1987, notes that
It is doubtod that anywhere elae in South Africa will one uncover
auch unity in political loyalties aa one doe* in African Fort
Elizabeth. The UDF and the ANC...enjoy naar total loyalty. (Riordan
1988b p 75).
This political involvement went beyond loyalty; 86% of residents
of Kwazakele claimed to have been members of civic or youth
organisations in the 1980s, and 94% said that area committee
structures had existed in their areas. 84% said that street
committees had existed in their streets in the 1986-7 period.
(Cherry 1993) Not only did they participate in the consumer
boycott and other mass campaigns through these committees, but
they participated in electing their own leadership at local
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level, and in political education classes. In addition to
political campaigning, the committees were seen as playing the
useful roles of controlling crime and keeping the streets clean;
and gave many residents a sense of real control over their lives.
While the democracy practised by these structures was somewhat
erratic, residents felt a sense of loyalty and 'ownership' of the
structures as expressed in these quotes t "No-one can come and
teach us how to build democratic structures now, we know that
very well"; "We managed to build democratic structures without
the help of the government"; "We have built our own democratic
government", to "control our own affairs" and "govern our
township." (Ibid)
Nor were those who participated in these structures the
'marginalized youth': activists claimed that those who
participated in the street and area committee structures were
"ordinary...honest church people who had problems with
apartheid"13 and that the representatives from area committee
structures on decision-making forums were "mostly older
people."" While the middle aged and elderly residents were
attending meetings, finding ways to continue providing basic
services to the township, control crime, and keep down the cost
of providing food for their families while not buying at
supermarkets, it was the youth who provided the 'shock troops'
of the quasi-insurrectionary situation from 1985 to 1987.
Galvanized by a militarist culture, they were sometimes
controlled by members of HK, the ANC underground, or the
leadership of the UDF; at other times they refused to acknowledge
the leadership of anyone other than the inaccessible Mandela.
While their methods were sometimes brutally violent, and
criticised by their elders, there was a widespread feeling that
all residents were 'on the same side'; and while not exonerating
their children from blame, the elders would protect them from
police harassment where possible, and contextualise their
Interview with Mike Xego, 15 November 1993.
Interview with Alex Rala, 12 November 1993
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actions.
c) Th« Political Cultures of Inclusion and exclusion
The political culture of African residents of Port Elizabeth in
the 20th Century contains many different and sometimes
contradictory discourses. The 'inclusion' of Africans as urban
residents and their perception of being part of the city, and the
arising politics of representation, deputation and negotiation,
were consistent with a discourse of rights, citizenship and
'modernization'. Together with this, language which appealed to
class identity or to a more populist, non-racial concept of
community were more prevalent than those which emphasized
separateness on ethnic, racial or cultural lines. The exclusion
of Africans from jobs and skills, the poverty in which they
lived, and in the 1980s the widespread unemployment and rejection
of schooling by the youth, led to a more militant discourse which
revered militarism and communism, and was occasionally - though
surprisingly not more frequently - anti-white.
The fact that the vast majority of African residents of Port
Elizabeth were, and are, Xhosa-speaking has meant that the
potential for ethnic division and ethnic mobilization has been
significantly less than in areas such as the PWV where migrant
labourers and urban residents from a range of ethnic groups have
congregated. As far back as 1931, a Port Elizabeth magistrate
thus stated that
"In this d i s tr i c t there i s not the faintest shadow of any tribal
system. The local natives consist of Fingoes, Xosas, Gaikas,
Gcalekas, Tembues, Basutos etc a l l inter marry freely, both by
Christian and Native r i tes . . .No Native Chief ever resided here"
(Cherry 1992 p 51).
Where different ethnic groups have sett led in the area, they have
been treated with respect and accepted in the community even as
they maintained a separate identity. The best example of this i s
perhaps the Koraten basket-makers - a group of maShona from
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Rhodesia who belonged to a religious sect referred to as the
'Hosannas'. Remembered with affection by previous residents of
Korsten, they were deported en mass in the late 1950s. They were
described by a resident as "Peaceloving and hardworking" (Cherry
1988 p 75)
Even so, this does not explain why movements based on ethnic
identity, such as Inkatha, have never had much resonance in the
Eastern Cape. The reasons for this lie perhaps in the stability
of the urban population, and the small proportion of migrant
workers retaining links to rural areas and traditional
authorities. New immigrants were accepted fairly soon after their
arrival, although tensions did arise at times. In one instance
in 1957, the ANC Homens League took aggressive action against men
who were breaking a stayaway; these men were workers from the
homelands, and their lack of commitment was met with
antagonism. (Cherry 1992 p 155) It was this division between
recent arrivals and old urbanites which enabled the municipality
to 'divide and remove' the residents of Korsten. Yet in another
instance, ANC women defended migrant workers' wives who had
recently immigrated to PE. These women used to come to PE by
train, and the Labour Bureau started arresting them' at the
station and endorsing them out. The ANC Womena' League responded
by complaining to the township superintendent, and when this did
not work, they slept at the station to prevent the new arrivals
from being arrested. (Cherry 1992 p 156).
In the 1980s, when Zulu policemen were brought into Eastern Cape
townships as part of the municipal forces to control the
rebellion, they were referred to derisively as 'amaTshaka'. This,
however, was not a response based in a positive sense of Xhosa
ethnic identity, but rather a response to a state strategy of
using 'others' against a particularly homogeneous community.
Songs referring to Gatsha Buthelezi were not aimed against him
as representing Zulu identity, but at Buthelezi as representing
the homeland system. This is borne out by the fact that even more
frequently, the object of attack, in both language and practise,
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were the African collaborators associated with the Black Local
Authorities - in the case of Port Elizabeth, the Ibhayi Council;
and the leaders of the 'homelands' of Ciakei and Transkei - Sebe
and Matanzima. In a survey of the language of the resistance
politics of the 1980s, it can be seen that there are very few
indications of mobilization around Xhoaa culture or ethnic
identity.(Cherry 1993a) 'African' and 'black' are used
inclusively, and are posed against 'the enemy'. These inclusive
definitions were adopted by the Black Consciousness movement in
Port Elizabeth in the 1970<i; many of the young leadership of this
movement in PE's schools went to Robben Island in 1977, and were
released in 1982 with a firm commitment to the non-racialism of
the ANC.
In the early 1980s, the ANC was quite consciously revived as the
leading liberation movement in the new mass-based organisations.
As one of the leaders of the PE Youth Congress and an ANC
underground member explained:
So I want into tha youth, together with comrades, but that decision
to 90 in there was a discussion with tha underground that I must go
in there ... you could aee the changing of the Black Consciousness
politics into the Freedom Charter politics taking place within FE.
Remember those days people were still singing the national anthem
wrongly - there was that PAC section, 'Makube Njalo....' - that's
not the national anthem as known by the ANC. People were still
saying 'Izwe ' othu iAfrika' within the trade union movement, and at
youth rallies; we discouraged all those kinds of things..it was a
direct plan from the underground to spearhead a certain political
trend, and loyalty, in a much more structured way, to the masses,
so that the ANC benefits at the end. So we built that ideology, that
understanding, at street and area committee level, and it started
to be understood that 'We are ANC."
In addition to demands for the release of leaders from prison,
the return of exiles, and the unbanning of the ANC, some of the
songs used in the period of rebuilding the Congress tradition in
Interview Mike Xego, 15 November 1993.
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the 1980s were old songs from the ANC campaigns of the 1950s.
They express, simply, opposition to the apartheid regime and to
the racist (white) 'enemy'; as well as specific demands around
particular apartheid laws. In one of these old songs we see a
reference to the term 'boers' - which means, in context, not
farmers but the oppressor who, in the decades of 'grand
apartheid', was the white Afrikaner who controlled the government
and implemented apartheid laws. The song is a particularly sad
and slow one, usually sung with pathos and humility rather than
anger - despite what may seem a particularly insulting phrase
(the boers are dogs). Many of the old songs (and some of the new)
were based on the tunes of well-known hymns - hence the somewhat
sombre or reverent nature of the tunes, in contrast to the later,
more militaristic songs which had a stronger 'beat'I
Senzenina, senzenina (What have we done)
Sonosethu bubunyama (Our only sin is our black skin)
Amabhulu azizinja (The boers are dogs)
Mayibuye iAfrika (Let Africa return)
The relatively easy transition from the language of black
consciousness to that of non-racialism can be better understood
if it is remembered that the older generation, both of leaders
and of ordinary members of the ANC, were still influential in
township politics. The repression of 1977 meant that black
consciousness organisations were a brief interlude in a much
longer political tradition, for no sooner had a new generation
of leadership been produced than they were 'converted' to the old
traditions. Despite the weakness of organisation in the coloured
and indian townships, and the tiny number of whites who aligned
themselves with the liberation movement in Port Elizabeth, the
tradition of non-racialism flourished in the UDF. Many of the
'old guard' of the ANC had either lived in Korsten or had worked
within the trade union movement in earlier decades.
In Korsten during the 1950s
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there ware Chinese, coloureda, and there was never any conflict
between the Africans and coloureds, between different groups
...There was a very good spirit in Korsten - we were united with the
so-called 'coloureda'.
Coloured residents, although not necessarily involved politically
with their African neighbours, felt that in Korsten there was a
lack of fear and a mutual respect between different people.
(Cherry 1988 p 75) The congress alliance took up a number of
campaigns in Korsten in the 1950s which were consciously designed
to build non-racial unity, such as campaigns against the
Population Registration Act, the removal of coloureds from the
voters role, and for the improvement of conditions at Livingstone
Hospital. (Cherry 1988) The 'mixed' constituency of influential
trade unions such as the FCWU, as well as the Womens League,
promoted non-racialism in practise among activists if not among
the majority of members who were residentially segregated from
the late 1950s. A small number of coloured, white and indian
activists contributed consistently to the leadership of the FCWU
and other trade unions, as well as the Women's League.
The realities of white rule were not easily overcome by
organisational practise, however, especially when mass militancy
went beyond the bounds of organized action. Non-aligned whites
who happened to be in the township at the 'wrong time'- during
the riots in 1952 in New Brighton,. and during the State of
Emergency in the 1980s - were murdered. Yet the influence wielded
by the non-racial ideology of the leadership, combined with the
common decency of the vast majority of residents who participated
in the more structured forms of mass action, meant that those
individuals of other colour - whether white, coloured or indian -
whose organisational allegiance was visible, were never
attacked.
Where appeals were made to Africanist or black consciousness
sentiments, they were usually in terms of an 'inclusive'
nationalism, where 'the people' were mobilized against 'the
enemy' who could be defined by the term 'amabhulu'. Examples of
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this are Vuyisile Mini - the Port Elizabeth trade unionist -
writing the song 'Pasopa Nants'indod'inyama, Vorster' (Watch out,
here is a black man, Vorster); or the 1980s song 'Kwela phezu
kwendlu kaLinda - uMam'uyajabula maaishayiblwlu' (Climb on top
of Linda's roof - my mother is jubilant when we beat the boers).
In the latter case, the enemy identified with the 'boers' is
Linda, the 'Mayor' of the Ibhayi Council.
As resistance intensified in the mid-1980s, the dominant trend
in the language of political mobilisation was that of militarism.
As the capacity of uMkhonto we Sizwe to carry out armed actions
inside South Africa increased, and as the 1976 'Soweto
generation' left the country to get trained and come back into
the country as guerillas, a whole new group of 'MK songs' became
popular. The armed struggle was venerated, the sacrifices
involved were portrayed as heroic, and many songs with a military
content were widely sung by school students organised by COSAS,
PEYCO and of course the amabutho who saw themselves as military
formations. An interesting dynamic is that while earlier songs
referred to Mandela and sometimes even Luthuli as leaders, later
songs referred more frequently to Oliver Tambo and Joe Slovo,
exiled leaders who were involved in directing the armed struggle.
The most well-known of these is no doubt 'Hamba Kahle' which is
almost the 'anthem' of uMkhonto, sung with deep reverance at the
many political funerals of the 1980s. He see in this song the
reference to 'killing the boers', and again it must be clear that
this is not a reference to fanners, or even specifically to
whites, but more generally to 'the enemy':
Hamba, Hamba Kahle Mkhonto, (Go well MK)
Mkhonto, Mkhonto we Sizwe
Thina 'bantu bo Mkhonto sizimisele (We the people of
MK, we are determined)
ukuwabulala wona lamabhulu (to kill these boers)
Buya. Buya kahle Mkhonto (Come back safely MK)
Mkhonto, Mkhonto we Sizwe
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Most songs reflect or encourage military mobilisation, referring
to soldiers and various weapons to be used.
Another significant element of this militarist discourse was, of
course, the ubiquitous 'toyi-toyi' - a simulation of military
discipline, in which hundreds or thousands of people would stamp
in unison, chanting words or simulating the noise of machine guns
or the throwing of grenades, under the direction of a 'leader'
who would call out the actions.
The different aspects of this language of mobilization combined
together into a discourse of resistance which was nearly
universal in PE's African townships in the 1980s, and much of
which has been carried through into the transition.
While it is nearly impossible to define categorically a culture
or discourse of resistance in absolute terms, it is possible to
argue that certain ideological 'themes' are dominant while others
are more or less absent. The presence or absence of such 'themes'
has relevance for our understanding of political culture in the
transition period, and in the conclusions we reach about such
issues as how to curb political violence, accommodate minorities,
create a culture of democracy or rights, and 'nation-building.'
The type of nationalism expressed in the political culture above
is both vague (when related to identity) and specific (when
concerned with anti-colonial demands such as land restoration or
political control of the state). A dominant theme in the culture
is internationalism, including a broad Africanism, and socialist
anti-imperialism. Neither of these conform to a narrow or
ethnically-based nationalism. The Africanism expressed does not
evoke a desire for territorial separateness, but the demand for
control over, or participation in, the existing state. A
significant, and positive, aspect of this political culture is
the demand for citizenship; for self-determination in the anti-
colonial rather than Afrikaner or ethno-nationalist sense; for
inclusion in institutions of 'Western democracy' rather than
exclusivity. Thus, while resistance took increasingly militant
and sometimes violent forms, the demands expressed were in terms
of the political tradition of inclusion. What the language of
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resistance does not say about democracy can be linked to an
understanding of populist militarist ideologies which tend to
promote intolerance.
The very success of the ANC'a building of ideological hegemony
resulted in a lack of tolerance for those who were 'outside' of
the mass organizations - not only the collaborators, but those
who stubbornly continued to support AZAPO or the PAC. So while
most residents of Kwazakele, who supported the ANC, perceived the
street and area committee structures as democratic, they - and
the strategies they were involved in implementing - were not
democratic to the minority of residents who differed
ideologically from them.. The hegemony of the ANC was so
extensive, however,, that after the UDF-AZAPO 'feud' in 1985, most
AZAPO supporters moved into particular areas of the township
which to this day do not have civic structures.
The legacy of political mobilization carried into the 1990s, and
ultimately into the post-election period, is reflected in the
still contradictory politics of today. The ways in which the
traditions of inclusion and exclusion, and the cultures of non-
racialism, inclusive nationalism, militarism and militancy,
democracy and intolerance are reflected in the current
transitional situation, are explored briefly in this conclusion.
IV: Conclusion.
How do the two traditions outlined above, and the elements of
political culture, 'mesh together' in the changed circumstances
since 1990? On the one hand, the very high percentage poll in the
Eastern Cape (92%) and the low number of spoilt papers indicate
the high level of political awareness. This reflects the prior
experience of the majority of Africans of participation in either
'formal' political institutions (the older generation who
remember the Native franchise and the Advisory Boards) and in
informally electing leadership (the younger generation who
participated in civic structures, street and area committees).
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The tradition of participation and the desire for inclusion are
reflected in the widespread and joyous embracing of parliamentary
democracy, aa illustrated in the introduction. The legitimacy of
the elections was based in part on the real sense of personal
pride felt by many residents, and the understanding that what
they had struggled for over many decades had been achieved. The
relative facility with which the non-racial transitional local
authority has been established reflects not only the
sophistication of the negotiators, who had been mobilizing under
the slogan of 'One City, One Municipality' since the mid-1980s,
but also the re-embracing of the old liberal tradition on the
part of the white municipal officials and of the principle of
non-racialism on the part of all participants.
On the other hand, there is confusion when it comes to ordinary
people's experience of institutions of direct democracy, and the
future role of civil society. Strong loyalty to the ANC and trust
in the new government is combined with high expectations and the
understanding on the part of many residents of Kwazakele that
they may have to engage in mass action to ensure delivery.
Others, accepting the limitations of representative democracy,
say they will simply have to vote for another party if the ANC
does not meet their needs. Residents are divided on the need for
independent organs of civil society, or structures of
participatory democracy, in future- nearly a third of those
interviewed said there would be no need for civics and trade
unions under a new government, because "Our government will see
to it that everything is in order"." Others saw the continued
need for civic organisation in different ways; some said they
will "continue to fight poor services" or "fight for the rights
of people in the township", while others said they would "work
hand in hand with local government officials in developing the
township" or "liaise with local authorities with regard to
programmes that need to be developed in communities""
15
 Kwazakele survey 1994.
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The ongoing controversy over the role of self-defence units
indicates that not only does territorial hegemony and intolerance
still exist, but that the militant and militarist culture of the
youth has yet to be channelled in a positive direction. Attempts
at retraining the members of SDUs and establishing 'community
policing' structures with the cooperation of the police are ways
in which this is being done. The high levels of violence and
repression in the 1980s dropped to almost non-existent levels in
the 1990s, in contrast to other regions where existing divisions
were able to be exploited to weaken the ANC's position in the
negotiation process. However, fierce competition for jobs and the
failure to integrate many returned MK combatants is likely to be
an ongoing source of tension.
What role people at grassroots level will play in the 'new
politics' of reconstruction is by no means clear. A process of
demobilization at street level is already clear; the civic
organisations have redefined their role in terms of negotiations
over the provision of housing and services, job-creation
projects, and the distribution of food aid. Thus, one rather
cynical activist described the demobilization process:
Today street and area committees don't deal with political issues
such as negotiations| they don't rise above disputes. Meetings of
zones or areas are. active - but people go to general meetings of the
area or the ANC branch) things are dead at street level. Things are
directed by organisations now; there is money around. The only means
of communication is by loudhailer. If you don't mention food or
electricity, attendance at meetings is poor. He used to have large
numbers of people attending political meetings, but not any more.
While the first survey of Kwazakele residents showed that a very
high percentage of people were members of civic and youth
organisations in the 1980s, in the second survey, conducted in
the week after the election, residents claimed to be members of
the ANC rather than of civics; while they were still members of
Interview Alex Rala, 14 July 1993
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other organisations, these were identified as church or sports
organisations, or trade unions." The political allegiances and
participation of residents has thus been 'transferred' to the
AMC; but does the ANC have the ability to function as a forum for
mass participatory democracy? Indications already are that it is
transforming into a more conventional political party, producing
leadership for different levels of government rather than
creating space for mass participation. It is difficult to see how
the Reconstruction and Development programme can involve people
at grassroots level in decision-making, prioritisation of needs,
and implementation.
Yet, the tradition of militant mass mobilization is strong, and
if the new authorities prove unable to meet people's demands, it
is unlikely that they will meekly accept the situation. The
tensions between this political culture and the 'normalized'
politics of representative democracy are already clear with
regard to the labour movement, the civil service, and prisoners.
A number of strikes have taken place in Port Elizabeth in the
short few weeks since the elections, despite the pleas from the
leadership for labour discipline, and admonishments that the time
for mass action is over.
In conclusion, the first tradition of 'inclusion', combined with
the hegemonic ideology of the ANC., has leads comfortably to the
legitimacy of the ANC government and the consensus politics of
the RDP, with the class compromises which that necessarily
entails, where people's needs are not met, or where the new.,
authorities are insensitive or in conflict with many people's
more radical idea of democracy, this tradition will come
increasingly into tension with the second tradition of militant
mass political participation. While the hegemony of the ANC gives
it some space to govern its supporters, this space is not
unconditional; it is restrained by the same tradition that built
it.
" Kwazakele survey 1994.
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